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GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY
1. Is the United States Increasing its Lead?
At the end of World War II a substantial fraction of
Europe’s capital stock was damaged and Europe
found itself in a state of economic backwardness com-
pared to the United States. In the following years,
under the impulse of reconstruction policies, US aid,
and European integration, European countries start-
ed closing the gap at an extremely rapid rate.
Such a convergence process is what we should expect
to observe under the assumptions of technological
diffusion across countries and international capital
mobility. As long as Europe is less rich than the
United States,i.e.has less capital,the return on invest-
ing in Europe should be higher than in the United
States, and Europe should accumulate capital more
rapidly than the United States. However, this is not
what happened. The period of convergence stopped
in the mid-1970s when oil shocks and rising unem-
ployment started taking their toll. Given that produc-
tivity per capita was still lower in Europe than in the
United States, one should have expected the conver-
gence process to have continued
at a moderate pace. Instead, the
United States exhibited a better
growth performance in the 1980s
and the 1990s than Europe. This
phenomenon is displayed in
Table 5.1.
Only Luxembourg and Ireland
managed to outperform the
United States. With respect to
other countries the United
States extended its lead.
Table 5.2 shows the relative gap
between per-capita GDP in
European countries and the
United States. These numbers
eliminate population growth as
a source of growing GDP dif-
ferentials between Europe and
the United States.
As we can see, in the 1990s Europe lost further
ground and in 2000 per capita GDP was 30 per cent
lower than in the United States, which was a larger
gap than in 1970. Among EU countries a clear
Table 5.1
Annual average GDP growth rate,
constant 1995 PPP USD
1970–1980 1980–1990 1990–2000
Germany 2.68 2.22 1.53*
France 3.21 2.33 1.77
Italy 3.53 2.19 1.50
Netherlands 2.88 2.16 2.84
Belgium 3.31 2.01 2.05
Luxembourg 2.55 4.36 5.15
United Kingdom 1.91 2.66 2.09
Ireland 4.63 3.56 6.64
Denmark 2.21 1.92 2.16
Spain 3.47 2.96 2.45
Greece 4.60 1.59 2.23
Portugal 4.63 2.88 2.57
Finland 3.39 3.02 2.03
Sweden 1.91 2.07 1.65
Austria 3.59 2.28 2.03
European Union 2.94 2.36 1.91
United States  3.15 3.14 3.25
* Because of German unification in 1990, the annual
GDP growth rate, at constant 1995 PPP USD, is calcu-
lated for the period 1991–2000.
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium.
Table 5.2
Per capita GDP relative to the United States,
constant 1995 PPP USD
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1995 2000
Germany 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.76 0.70
France 0.75 0.80 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.73 0.69
a)
Italy 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.65
b)
Netherlands 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.75
b)
Belgium 0.73 0.79 0.81 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.74
b)
Luxembourg 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.90 1.05 1.11 1.19 1.25
b)
UK 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.63
b)
Ireland 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.81
b)
Denmark 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.76
b)
Spain 0.51 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.54
b)
Greece 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.45
c)
Portugal 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.47
b)
Austria 0.69 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.76 0.72
b)
Finland 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.71 0.67 0.71
a)
Sweden 0.84 0.86 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.69
b)
European Union 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.70
a) Calculated with total population of 1999.
b) Calculated with total population of 1998.
c) Calculated with total population of 1997.
Source: OECD, Statistical Compendium.trend of convergence is only visible for Luxem-
bourg and Ireland, while over the last 30 years
most of the other countries converged temporarily
but than diverged again, in particular during the
1990s.
It may be believed that this latter trend is essen-
tially the outcome of de-synchronisation of busi-
ness cycles between the two sides of the Atlantic.
This may indeed be part of the story. Nevertheless,
in 2000,which was,in our view,the peak of the cur-
rent cycle on both sides of the Atlantic,Europe was
considerably worse off (in relative terms) than at
the beginning of the 1990s.
2. The Role of the Labour Market
What explains the exceptional performance of the
United States in the 1990s? In Table 5.3 the supply
determinants of growth are shown for both the
United States and Europe. In the United States
about half of the 3.4 per cent average GDP growth
in the 1990s can be explained by the increase in
labour input (per hour) (1.8 percentage points) and
the other half by the increase in productivity (per
hour) (1.7 percentage points). In Europe growth
was only 1.8 per cent,and most of this growth can be
explained by productivity gains (1.6 percentage
points) while the contribution from additional
labour input was very small (0.3 percentage points)
and in some countries, such as Germany, even nega-
tive. While the United States succeeded in employ-
ing a growing labour force and in reducing the
unemployment rate,European labour markets were
much less flexible,and in many countries unemploy-
ment increased and participation rates declined.
Differences in labour market institutions play var-
ious roles in explaining the differential growth
experience of Europe and the United States in the
1980s and 1990s.
First of all, labour market developments affect
changes in labour input. The workforce has risen
more in the United States than in Europe due to
strong immigration. If the labour market works
properly,as is approximately the case in the United
States, this implies an equiproportionate increase
in labour input, and thus faster growth than in
Europe. If the age and skill structure of the immi-
grants and their participation rates were the same
as those of Americans, this growth supplement
would be entirely eliminated if one looked at per
capita growth. However, this is not the case as
immigrants are more likely to be of working age
and may have higher participation rates even con-
trolling for their age. On the other hand, they are
typically less skilled than natives, which tends to
reduce their contribution to growth. Hence their
net effect on measured productivity is ambiguous.
In Europe,too,active population has increased due to
demographic changes, changes in female participa-
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Table 5.3
Determinants of Growth 1990–1999, Comparison between the United States and Europe
Average annual percentage change, in constant prices
Change in productivity
 caused by:
GDP Labour Capital Labour Capital TFP
input stock productivity deepening
United States
1990–1995 2.4 1.4 1.9 1.0 0.2 0.9
1996–1999 4.4 2.1 3.7 2.3 0.5 1.8





c) 1.4 (1.6) – 0.4 (– 0.6) 2.3 (3.0) 1.9 (2.3) 1.0 (1.2) 0.9 (1.0)
1996–1999 2.2 (1.7) 0.9 (– 0.4) 2.2 (2.3) 1.3 (2.1) 0.5 (1.1) 0.8 (1.1)




1996–1999 5.5 2.3 0.9 3.1 – 0.5 3.7
Ireland
1996–1999 9.9 5.8 4.7 4.0 – 0.4 4.5
a) Weighted average of following countries: Germany (1992–95, 1996–99), Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden, Spain, United Kingdom. – 
b)Germany. – 
c)Germany 1992–95.
Source: Oliner and Sichel (2000), calculations by the author.CESifo Forum Special 59
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tion, and also an inflow of immigrants. But European
labour markets,plagued by wage rigidity,did not react
with a matching increase in employment. Instead,
unemployment has risen. This has tended to push
down per capita growth in Europe. Finally, another
factor which boosted labour input in the United
States, especially in the 1990s, is the fall in the natural
rate of unemployment, which seems to have gone
down from 6 per cent to 4 per cent.It is not clear what
caused this, but some argue that it may simply be a
composition effect due to a lower fraction of youth in
the workforce (Shimer 1998). The argument is that
the young automatically have a higher rate of unem-
ployment because of their higher labour turnover
rate. However, since the same phenomenon is taking
place in Europe,it should not have differential effects
to a first-order approximation.
If Europe had had more flexible labour markets, it
would have employed more people and grown
faster in the 1990s. Or, alternatively, Europe could
have grown at the same rate while investing less, as
the United States did, which would have meant
higher consumption and higher welfare.
The contribution of an increase in labour input is
neutralised if one looks at labour productivity or,
better,at hourly productivity,since in this case out-
put is divided by the appropriate labour input.
Labour productivity depends on technology – as
measured by total factor productivity – and on the
capital/labour ratio. Here differences in labour
market institutions tend to generate a positive
growth differential in favour of Europe, because
higher wages induce firms to substitute capital for
labour up to the point where labour productivity is
compatible with the wage level.When this process
takes place,faster capital accumulation is observed
than if wages were not rigid.This probably helps to
explain why labour productivity rose faster in
Europe than in the United States in the 1980s.
However, this is nothing to rejoice about, since the
extra capital accumulation is in relative terms.Total
capital is lower than at the full employment level,
but proportionately by less than employment.
Changes in the composition of the workforce, or
adjustment of the capital/labour ratio to changes in
labour market institutions are only transitory phe-
nomena. That is, they change the long-run level of
output, but not its growth rate (see Box). In the
long run, growth depends on the level of technolo-
gy (which we measure using total factor productiv-
ity). Until 1990,TFP used to grow at a much faster
Box
Growth vs. Level Effects
Many economists involved in short-run macroeconomic analysis express their forecasts in terms of growth
rates. However, the growth rate can be high for several different reasons. In particular, it can be high be-
cause the economy is adjusting to a shock which has permanently increased the level of GDP by a given
amount. For example, an increase in labour market participation by 10 per cent typically increases GDP by
10 per cent. Upon impact, however, the effect is virtually zero as it takes time for the labour market to ab-
sorb these new entrants and for firms to accumulate the capital needed to create new jobs. Then, as compe-
tition by these new entrants depresses wages, firms will find it worthwhile to create new positions and to in-
vest accordingly. As they do so, GDP rises, i.e. experiences a boost in its growth rate. Over time, however, as
these new entrants are absorbed, wage pressure goes up, and the additional flow of job creation and invest-
ment gradually dies out. Growth slows, and GDP eventually grows at the same rate as before the shock,
being simply 10 per cent higher than if the shock had not occurred. This is what is called a level effect. A
similar response is observed if there is a permanent increase in the savings rate, for example, which, after a
while raises the level of the capital output ratio and of GDP.
In contrast, a permanent increase in the resources devoted to R&D will increase the number of discoveries
being made each year, and hence the pace at which productivity grows. This generates a permanent im-
provement in the underlying growth rate of the economy. For example, the economy may now grow at 3 per
cent a year instead of 2 per cent a year forever.
Some economists doubt whether such permanent increases in productivity growth actually do occur in rea-
lity. They point out that innovation has decreasing returns and that people eventually run out of good ideas,
so that the growth supplement permitted by an increment in resources devoted to R&D would eventually
disappear. However, there is no doubt that the growth effects of a permanent boost to innovation are much
longer lived than those of an increase in savings or in active population.rate in Europe than in the United States because
Europe’s technology level was catching up with the
US level. Since then, a new phenomenon has
occurred: the United States has grown faster than
Europe in terms of TFP. At the same time it has
closed its secular gap in investment rates.The next
section investigates whether a new growth regime
is now prevailing, and whether Europe should
worry about it.
3. The Effect of Information Technology
Investment rates in the United States accelerated
considerably in the 1990s. However, they have tra-
ditionally been below those of Europe and have
remained so until very recently, as shown in
Table 5.4. So it is unlikely that physical capital
accumulation explains why the US-European gap
widened in the 1990s, as it has merely caught up in
terms of investment rates. In fact as shown in
Table 5.3, capital stock growth in the business sec-
tor was somewhat higher in the United States than
in Europe, but as labour increased much more in
the United States, the capital deepening effect (i.e.
the increase in capital intensity) was only half of
that in Europe (0.4 against 0.8). Despite the small-
er capital deepening effect, labour productivity
growth in the United States was slightly higher in
the 1990s than in Europe (1.7 per cent against
1.6 per cent).The reason for the higher US labour
productivity growth was that its total factor pro-
ductivity, which is an estimate of the role of techni-
cal progress, increased more (1.4 per cent against
0.9 per cent). The difference is even bigger in the
second half of the 1990s, although part of this dif-
ference could also be cyclical as the United States
experienced an exceptional boom while the recov-
ery in Europe remained more moderate.
Table 5.5 looks at the growth rate of total factor
productivity as calculated by the OECD over a
longer time horizon.
The results are striking. Whereas total factor pro-
ductivity grew much faster in Europe than in the
United States prior to 1990,this pattern reversed in
the 1990s. During that decade, the United States
accumulated almost ten extra percentage points of
productivity growth relative to Europe.
An important question is therefore: what explains
this development? A leading hypothesis is that the
United States has benefited from new information
technologies much more than Europe.This advan-
tage comes from several factors.
First,the United States is an important producer of
IT goods such as semiconductors, computers and
software. Table 5.6 summarizes the GDP share of
these industries in the United States and in
Europe.Clearly,the US share is higher than that of
the European Union, and the three major Euro-
zone countries produced ICT goods less propor-
tionately than the United States. However, two














Total factor productivity is calculated as a residual after
the contributions of labour and capital inputs have been
accounted for.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (2001).
Table 5.5
Total factor productivity, cumulative growth
over 5-year periods






Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.
Table 5.6
Share of value added in information and
communication technologies
in %









Source: OECD Statistical Compendium (2000).CESifo Forum Special 61
Chapter 5
notable exceptions stand out: The UK, and two
Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland.These three
countries have a share of value added in ICT which
is similar to that of the United States.
These industries, which account for a larger frac-
tion of US GDP, grew much faster than others.
Therefore, one element of an explanation for the
better US performance is a composition effect: the
United States grows faster because a greater frac-
tion of its GDP is in sectors which themselves have
grown fast. One underlying reason is that IT prod-
ucts seem to be associated with a considerable
potential for learning and productivity improve-
ments.1
Second, an increasing fraction of investment has
been in the form of information technology (IT).
According to Jorgenson (2001),this investment has
been on-going from the mid-1970s and, until
recently, has been accelerating. However until the
1990s economists failed to see its effect on aggre-
gate productivity, especially since total factor pro-
ductivity growth slowed down to almost zero in the
mid-1970s. In the meantime, it has shown up in the
growth statistics.Information technology is compa-
rable to the steam engine or electricity in that it is
a general purpose technology which may raise pro-
ductivity in all sectors of the economy.Adoption of
IT in turn triggers technological and organisation-
al innovations in the user sectors.For these reasons
an adoption lag can have substantial negative con-
sequences for the productive and innovative per-
formance of an economy.2
Finally, the last half of the 1990s is associated with
the development of the Internet. The Internet has
been disproportionately developed in the United
States, and it disproportionately benefits it. This is
because it is a network, and the economic contri-
butions of the network grow more than propor-
tionately with its number of participants, as it is
determined by the number of matches within the
network. Thus, networks benefit larger markets
and larger linguistic zones more than smaller ones.
Both this market size effect and the use of English
as a lingua franca imply that the number of sites in
English vastly outnumber those in other languages.
According to Jorgenson (2001), over the period
1995 to 1999, the output of the US computer indus-
try grew by 40 per cent, and that of the software
industry by 20 per cent. Similar figures are found
(36 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively) for
growth in the stock of computers and software cap-
ital in the US economy. While this means that in
1999 information technology capital only repre-
sents 5 per cent of annual GDP, its contribution to
the average annual growth rate of 3.4 per cent is
about 1 percentage point.Furthermore,this is prob-
ably an under-estimate as the externalities generat-
ed by IT may account for some of the residual total
factor productivity growth of 0.75 per cent,while IT
has also facilitated the quality of the workforce
associated with higher education.
From a broader perspective, one may ask why it
has taken such a long time for IT to have a notice-
able impact on growth. This is a matter of much
speculation, but recent theoretical and empirical
work has claimed that technological breakthroughs
diffuse quite slowly and may not even be adopted
for a while.The reason is that there are high learn-
ing costs associated with implementing the new
technology. Furthermore, part of this learning is
social in that one draws lessons from others’ expe-
rience with the new technology. Consequently, a
firm has a strategic incentive to delay adoption of
the new technology until others have adopted it.
Finally, when the new technology is invented there
is an initial stock of capital specific to older tech-
nologies, and it may be valuable to wait for this
capital to depreciate before investing in the new
technology. As argued by Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997), this implies that technological
diffusion is slow. According to their estimates, it
takes about 15 years for a new technology to be
adopted by 50 per cent of firms.
According to these authors’ numerical simulations,
a technological breakthrough initially leads to a
slowdown in the rate of measured productivity
growth. This is because the introduction of a new
technology requires a sustained investment in
learning at the beginning of this technology’s life
1 For example,in 1965 Gordon E.Moore made the observation that
the number of transistors contained by a micro-chip doubled every
18–24 months. One may have believed that this was typical of an
infant industry, but the semiconductor industry is no longer in its
infancy and Moore's law has not been invalidated yet after
35 years! As a result, growth in capacity has been astronomical. In
1971 a chip contained 2,300 transistors. In 2000 it contained 42 mil-
lion. Conversely, the price of microprocessor, has experienced a
tremendous downward trend. According to Jorgenson (2001), the
price of a chip declined by 40 per cent per cent a year on average
between 1974 and 1996. Given the increase in capacity of these
integrated circuits, this means a 70 per cent yearly decline in the
unit price of capacity.
2The international comparison of IT investment in volume terms is,
however, distorted by differences in price measurement (hedonic
versus traditional approach).cycle. As a consequence, skilled labour is trans-
ferred from the direct production activity to learn-
ing, and the medium-run effect of that is that pro-
ductivity in the output sector is depressed. Only in
the long run does the economy reap the full bene-
fits of the technological breakthrough, once the
transitional period of learning the new technology
is over and most skilled workers are employed
again in the direct production activity. This vision
squares well with the observation that in the mid-
1970s, when the personal computer was invented,
there was a severe slowdown in the rate of mea-
sured total factor productivity growth. This phe-
nomenon has been and remains a matter of much
debate. One leading interpretation is that it was
due to soaring energy prices associated with the
first oil shock. While it is hard entirely to dismiss
the role of energy prices, as Greenwood and
Yorukoglu do, it is plausible that the oil shock
played a role in speeding the adoption of new tech-
nologies by further depressing the value of exist-
ing, energy-intensive vintages of capital. Evidence
from the stock market squares well with this view.
The mid-1970s were associated with a sharp drop
in stock prices. This was followed by a recovery
which turned into an explosion in the 1980s and
1990s. Hobijn and Jovanovic (2000) distinguish
between the contribution to stock prices of firms
that were already around in 1972, and were sup-
posedly locked into an old technology, intensive in
energy and unfriendly to IT, and firms that entered
the market later and adopted new technology. A
striking finding is that the rise in the stock market
in the 1980s and 1990s is entirely due to new firms.
Incumbents never recovered from the drop in their
stock values triggered by high energy prices and
technological breakthroughs. Furthermore, indus-
tries where stock prices dropped by the largest
margin were precisely those where IT investment
was subsequently the strongest. This phenomenon
would not have taken place had the surge in ener-
gy prices been the sole reason for the fall in the
value of incumbent firms, but also reflected mar-
kets’ expectations that incumbent firms were not
going to be able to compete with new entrants
using superior technologies. For example, share
prices dropped by 44 per cent in manufacturing
(where IT represents a relatively low fraction of
total capital) and rose by more than 70 per cent in
services (where IT is a high fraction of the total
capital stock). Therefore, the productivity slow-
down could be re-interpreted as the net of two
effects: a direct reduction in productivity in old
technologies, and a diversion of skilled labour
input toward learning the new technologies.
Another interesting aspect of the IT revolution,
which has implications for Europe, is that it has
been associated with an increase in the rate of
“creative destruction”, namely with greater entry
and exit of firms. Hence, the rate of business fail-
ures almost trebled in the 1980s as compared to the
1960s and 1970s.And at the same time there was a
four-fold increase in the rate of business incorpo-
rations.
Altogether, these pieces of evidence are reason-
ably convincing that IT played an important role in
the recent boost in US economic performance.
However, this does not imply that the proceeds of
growth are shared equally among the population.
In particular, the last three decades have been
associated with a rise in US wage inequality.
Between 1974 and 1985, workers below the 60th
percentile of the distribution of wages all experi-
enced negative wage growth, on average, while
workers above that level experienced positive
wage growth. Hence the income share of the bot-
tom quintile (i.e. the poorest 20 per cent) fell from
4.2 per cent to 3.4 per cent between 1974 and 1995,
while the top quintile income share has increased
from 41.9 per cent to 49.2 per cent (Wolfson and
Murphy, 1998).
While this increase in inequality is partly due to
the collapse of egalitarian wage-setting institutions
such as trade unions, labour economists are con-
vinced that technical change is the driving force
behind the rise in inequality, and recent evidence
suggests that computers are one of the most impor-
tant factors.Therefore, the force which allowed the
United States to take-off in the last twenty years,
widening the productivity gap with Europe, is also
the one which made it more unequal and which
may generate social conflicts in the future.
For example,Autor et al. (2001) have found a high
correlation between computerisation at the indus-
try level and a shift in the composition of labour
input away from routine tasks in favour of non-
routine cognitive tasks.This is direct evidence that
computers substitute for tasks performed by low-
skilled workers and are complementary with tasks
performed by highly educated workers. According
to their estimates, this means that, holding factor
prices constant, the total proportion of college-
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educated workers in the workforce should have
increased by 15 percentage points between 1970
and 1990. This is a measure of the size of the
demand shock triggered by computerisation.
Similarly, Doms et al. (1997) find that plants that
adopt new information technologies more than
others have a greater proportion of highly educat-
ed workers, managers, and professionals.
Beyond the direct complementarity between new
technologies and skills, these may tend to increase
inequality because more educated workers are in a
better position to learn them. Consequently, when
a new technology is introduced, it is likely to
attract only workers with a relatively high level of
education, while the others remain working with
the old technology. A consequence is that capital
moves from the old to the new technology. This
reduces the complementary input for workers who
remained in the old technology, which in turn
reduces their productivity and wages. Caselli
(1999) has studied this phenomenon and points
out that the IT revolution has indeed been associ-
ated with a greater dispersion of capital/labour
ratios.
In the longer run, one may be more optimistic
about the consequences of technological break-
throughs for the distribution of income. As time
passes,the new technology becomes easier to oper-
ate. This is because educational levels go up, and
also because there are strong market incentives
eventually to design technology so as to make it
easier for unskilled workers to use. This way, a
large number of workers can use it, which increas-
es the scale of production and thus the monopoly
rents earned by those who designed the new tech-
nology.
This is what happened to the automobile industry
when Henry Ford introduced the assembly line in
1913. This allowed a large number of low-skilled
labourers to work on the new technology, which
increased their productivity and wages relative to
their previous activity in other sectors, and hence
reduced inequality. The same phenomenon is
observable in the computer industry, as more user-
friendly operating systems and software are being
introduced. Some formal models indeed predict
that inequality tends to overshoot its long-run level
after the introduction of a new technology, i.e. to
go up and then down. Indeed the increase in
inequality has levelled off in recent years.3
4. Documenting Europe’s Technological Deficit
If we are willing to accept the hypothesis that
information technologies played a key role in the
US productivity surge in the 1990’s, one may ask
whether the inability of Europe to catch up has to
do with a deficit in high technologies.
To begin with, there is evidence that the United
States is more actively involved in research and
development and more specialised in high-tech
goods than Europe. For example, the OECD
Science and Technology indicators imply that
R&D expenditures are about 20 per cent higher,as
a fraction of GDP, in the United States than in
Europe. In 1998, the United States was paying
30 cents in royalties to the rest of the world for
every dollar of royalties it received. The corre-
sponding figures are 59 cents for the UK, $1.18 for
Germany, $1.38 for France, $1.74 for Italy, and
$6.64 for Spain.
Furthermore, Butler (1992) shows that high-tech
manufacturing output represented 30 per cent of
US manufacturing output in 1990, and 20 per cent
of German manufacturing output. Between 1985
and 1990, this figure shows an upward trend in the
United States, while it has stagnated in Germany.
Similarly, Kravis and Lipsey (1992) have computed
indices of comparative advantage in high-tech,
medium-tech, and low-tech goods defined as the
ratio of the export share in the corresponding tech-
nology group over total export shares.They report
that in 1986, Germany’s comparative advantage in
high tech-goods had dropped to 0.86 from 1.08 in
1966. At the same time, the United States had
enhanced its comparative advantage from 1.4 to
1.6, and Japan’s had slightly deteriorated from
1.7 to 1.6.
Does this pattern also apply to information tech-
nologies? If one takes the software industry as an
example,a recent OECD study (1998) shows that it
accounts for 2.7 per cent of GDP in the United
States versus only 0.9 per cent in France. The cor-
responding figures for employment are 0.9 per cent
and 0.7 per cent respectively,implying greatly high-
er labour productivity in that sector in the United
States as compared with France. On the other
3 According to Wolfson and Murphy (1998), bottom wages started
growing again between 1985 and 1995,but this was not sufficient to
reverse inequality. However, the bottom income share was almost
constant between 1985 and 1995.hand,if one aggregates all IT sectors together,then
Europe has comparable or even higher employ-
ment shares (OECD,2000).But productivity in this
sector is again much higher in the United States,
40 per cent higher than in Germany and almost
twice as high as in France. Indeed, Business Week
has reported that out of the 100 top firms in the
New Economy, only six are European, and three of
these are Scandinavian (in Cohen and Debonneuil,
2001).
Thus,Europe tends to specialise less in the produc-
tion of high-tech goods than does the United
States.This pattern of trade is mirrored by the pat-
tern of specialisation in research and development.
For example, in 1993 the US accounted for 54 per
cent of world patents in biotechnology, 51 per cent
in computers, and 32 per cent in communication,
versus 13 per cent, 14 per cent and 13 per cent,
respectively, for France plus Germany. On the
other hand, these two countries accounted for
25 per cent of world patents in instruments, 25 per
cent in construction, and 52 per cent in transporta-
tion,vs.6 per cent,5 per cent and 3 per cent for the
United States (Office de la Science, 1997).Also, in
the United States, the IT sector accounts for 35 per
cent of total business R & D,while the correspond-
ing figures are 26 per cent for France and 20 per
cent for Germany (OECD, 2000). In other words,
Europe innovates in medium-tech, mature indus-
tries, while the United States is at the cutting edge.
Why does this matter? There is no a priori reason
why producing yoghurts should be more detrimen-
tal to the welfare of consumers than producing
micro-chips.However,it is likely that specialisation
in high-tech industries has side benefits which may
enhance growth and benefit the economy as a
whole. These industries offer more opportunities
for learning and innovation than low-tech ones,
and allow the economy to grow faster and obtain
more rents associated with intellectual property
rights.The above mentioned evidence on the fall in
semiconductor prices and the explosive increase in
micro-chip capacity suggests that this is indeed the
case.
In principle, this may be offset by relative price
effects:the terms of trade of the fast-growing,high-
tech economy deteriorate relative to the slow-
growing, low-tech one because low-tech goods are
not perfect substitutes for high-tech goods. In
other words, low-tech economies also benefit from
the extra growth potential of high-tech ones,
because yoghurts become more expensive relative
to computers. However, the comparative growth
experience of Europe and the United States over
the last ten years suggests that these price effects
are not strong enough to offset the growth premi-
um associated with specialisation in high-tech
goods.
While high-technology innovations and production
have important implications for growth, using
them is even more important. Hence, the question
now is whether Europe is also lagging in the adop-
tion of new technologies.
Table 5.7 relates to the diffusion of the Internet by
reporting the number of Internet hosts per 1,000
inhabitants.Admittedly this also measures special-
isation in the production of information technolo-
gy. But to the extent that site content is country
specific, the greater the density of hosts, the easier
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Table 5.7
Number of Internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants
in July 2001
Country Internet host per
1,000 inhabitants (Rank)




























Slovak Republic 7.66 (27)
Mexico 4.66 (28)
Turkey 3.63 (29)
An Internet host is a domain name (name server) that
has an IP address (A) record associated with it. This
would be any computer sytem connected to the Internet
(via full or part-time, direct or dial-up connections).
Source: www.netsizer.com.CESifo Forum Special 65
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the access to information that is useful to resident
households and firms.
Major European countries are far behind the
United States, by a factor of more than ten in the
case of France. Another notable fact is that small
Nordic countries fare much better, with a density
comparable to that of the United States. In spite of
this exception,Europe is clearly behind the United
States – the EU has an Internet density less than a
fifth of that of the United States.
One could speculate that these wide differences
simply reflect a late start and that Europe is catch-
ing up quickly. However, there is no sign of such a
trend. Between 1997 and 1999, for example, the
density of Internet hosts trebled in the United
States and France, and only doubled in Germany.
Thus it does not appear to be growing faster in
Europe than in the United States.
As Table 5.8 shows, there is also a deficit in terms
of access lines to the telephone. However, this
deficit is less pronounced: the order of magnitude
is 10–20 per cent of US density for major European
countries, with the Nordic countries standing out
again as an exception.
According to our hypothesis, therefore, Nordic
countries should have kept pace with the United
States in growth terms. This is in fact only true for
Finland in the second half of the 1990s, which grew
by 5.5 per cent, a figure comparable to the 4.4 per
cent growth rate of the United States.
One technology in which Europe has the reputa-
tion of leading the United States is cellular phones.
While it is true that some prominent cell phone
manufacturers are European,in terms of use this is
not so much true. Table 5.9 reports the number of
subscriptions per 1,000 inhabitants in 1997.
At this date, Nordic countries were all using cell
phones much more than the United States. But all
other European countries were clearly lagging,
with Italy on a par.
Further below we discuss possible causes of the
European IT gap. One important element, howev-
er, is the difference in prices between the two sides
of the Atlantic. In particular, according to the
OECD, the average price of Internet access is
about twice as high in countries such as France,
Germany or the United Kingdom as compared
with the United States. Interestingly, Nordic prices
are much more in line with US ones. This suggests
that differences in supply, rather than demand,
underlie the European handicap in Internet pene-
tration.
That Europe invests less in IT than the United
States is also evident from data on the software
industry and on computer services. In 1995, this
market’s turnover was $212 trillion in the United
Table 5.8
Access lines to the telephone
Country 1980 1990 1997
Australia 0.35 (9) 0.46 0.51
Austria 0.29 (15) 0.42 0.46
Belgium 0.25 (18) 0.39 0.48
Canada 0.41 (5) 0.55 0.62 (7)
Switzerland 0.45 (2) 0.58 0.64 (4)
Czech Republic 0.11 (23) 0.16 0.32
Germany 0.26 (17) 0.40 0.55
Denmark 0.43 (4) 0.57 0.64 (4)
Spain 0.19 (21) 0.32 0.40
Finland 0.36 (7) 0.54 0.56
France 0.30 (14) 0.50 0.58 (8)
United Kingdom 0.31 (13) 0.44 0.54
Greece 0.24 (19) 0.39 0.52
Hungary 0.06 (26) 0.10 0.32
Ireland 0.14 (22) 0.28 0.42
Iceland 0.37 (6) 0.51 0.57
Italy 0.23 (20) 0.39 0.45
Japan 0.33 (12) 0.44 0.48
Korea 0.07 (25) 0.36 0.52
Luxembourg 0.36 (7) 0.48 0.67 (2)
Mexico 0.04 (28) 0.06 0.10
Netherlands 0.35 (9) 0.46 0.57
Norway 0.29 (15) 0.50 0.63 (6)
New Zealand 0.35 (9) 0.44 0.51
OECD 0.28 0.39 0.49
Poland 0.05 (27) 0.09 0.19
Portugal 0.10 (24) 0.24 0.41
Sweden 0.58 (1) 0.68 0.68 (1)
Turkey 0.03 (29) 0.12 0.28
United States 0.44 (3) 0.54 0.66 (3)
Source: OECD, Telecommunications Database (1999).
Table 5.9
Number of subscriptions to (analog and digital)
















Souce: OECD Telecommunications Database (1999).States, against only $60 trillion in France plus Ger-
many, which together have a population of about
half that of the United States.
5. Explaining Europe’s Technological Deficit
If it is true that the gap between Europe and the
United States widened because the former failed
to adopt new information technologies, why did
this happen?
A first set of explanations relies on the idea that
product and labour market regulations deter spe-
cialisation in high-tech industries and reduce the
incentives for technical change. As we have point-
ed out above, in the United States adoption of new
technologies was associated with an increase in
creative destruction – both the rate of entry and
exit in the market increased.In contrast,in Europe
firm creation does not seem very dynamic. For
example,according to the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (1999), the percentage of adults partici-
pating in entrepreneurial activity is 4 per cent in
Germany, 3.5 per cent in Italy and the UK, and
only 1.8 per cent in France, vs. 10 per cent in the
United States.4
Europe’s deficit in terms of enterprise creation and
risk-taking may be explained by a variety of regu-
latory factors:
• Heavy regulation in product markets increases
barriers to entry. For example, as we have seen
above, Internet penetration is limited by high
costs, evidently due to reduced competition in
Europe’s telecom industry, which has been
deregulated much more recently than that of
the United States. These arguments, combined
with the above-mentioned evidence on the key
role played by IT in the US growth surge, sug-
gest that the dynamic gains from deregulating
such sectors, i.e. the gains from increased inno-
vation and dynamism, may be even higher than
the static gains to consumers in the form of
lower prices.
• Venture capital markets also appear to have
played a role, and have developed later in
Europe than in the United States. These mar-
kets in Europe have a long way to go before
they are comparable in relative size with the
United States.For example,the French Nouveau
Marché, which is the equivalent of the NAS-
DAQ, had a total market capitalisation of
q22 billion as of 31.12.00, as opposed to the
Premier Marché, the equivalent of the NYSE,
whose capitalisation at the same date was
q1463 billion.Thus the Nouveau Marché’s capi-
talization is just a minute 1.5 per cent of the
Premier Marché. In contrast, the ratio between
NASDAQ’s capitalisation and NYSE capitalisa-
tion in 2000 was as high as 55 per cent (WestLB
Panmure, 2001). Of course, this difference
reflects supply as well as demand factors.If risk-
taking is penalised by taxes and regulation, lack
of managerial culture, or inadequate human
capital, then we expect risk markets to be small-
er in Europe, even in the absence of any imped-
iment to their functioning. But the sheer size of
the difference suggests that more is at work. In
some sense, venture capital markets failed to
take off in Europe, perhaps reflecting a vicious
circle of expectations that they would remain
marginal. If a financial market is expected to be
too thin,it has poor properties in terms of diver-
sification and liquidity. This in turn makes peo-
ple reluctant to invest in it, thus validating the
expectation that it will not grow (Pagano, 1993).
A coordinated effort must be made to get out of
this financial underdevelopment trap.
• Labour market regulation is also likely to play
an important role. Dismissal costs prevent
downsizing in obsolete industries, thus retaining
human resources in low productivity sectors.
This reduces the scope for the expansion of new
sectors and the ability of Europe to compete
with the United States in new technologies. In
the long run, Europe finds itself with an eco-
nomic structure biased toward older technolo-
gies, implying lower productivity and lower liv-
ing standards. If new technologies are more
intensive in dynamic learning externalities, then
the productivity gap may widen as time passes.
Furthermore, many national regulations con-
cerning dismissals go beyond the simple penali-
sation of redundancies: they often assimilate a
change in tasks assigned to incumbent workers
with a dismissal, so that a court may rule out
such changes. Because of such practices, not
only specialisation in new technologies is dis-
couraged,but also their use as an input for firms
producing other types of goods.
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More fundamentally, labour market regulation
distorts the pattern of comparative advantage
away from new,high-tech goods and in favour of
mature, low-tech or medium-tech goods (Saint-
Paul, 1997, 2001). The reason is that demand is
more volatile at earlier stages of the product life
cycle, as has been found by studies of turnover
(Dunne et al., 1990, Davis and Haltiwanger,
1992). Given that employment protection
increases the true cost of labour by an amount
which is the greater, the greater the likelihood
that the job will be destroyed, they penalize
young firms and industries more than mature
ones. Figure 5.1 below illustrates this argument
by depicting the cost of producing a good as a
function of its age, for a “rigid” (heavily regulat-
ed) country and a flexible one.
Because volatility falls with age, so does the cost of
labour in the rigid country, whereas it does not
depend on volatility in the flexible one.
Consequently, the rigid country will specialise in
goods that are at a mature stage of their life cycle,
and the flexible country will specialise in young
goods. The welfare consequences of this pattern
need not harm the rigid country; but they will if
specialising in young goods implies a bigger growth
potential in the long run.
Yet if this is the right explanation, why is it that
small Nordic countries have managed to keep pace
to the United States in high technology,despite the
fact that dismissal costs there are comparable with
those prevailing in Continental Europe? One pos-
sible explanation is that they have designed alter-
native adjustment devices, such as active labour
market policies.
Finally, another institution which may have played
a role is the Educational System. While an even
greater proportion of people go to college in the
United States than in Europe, at the doctoral level
the US system is far more elitist and engages in
much more cutting-edge research. US universities
spend considerable resources on screening appli-
cants and attracting the best students. They devel-
op an adequate reward structure by waiving tuition
fees and offering grants to good students. During
their studies, graduate students are subjected to
intense training which puts them at the frontier of
research. At the level of recruitment of assistant
professors,the best candidates – who are identified
by word-of-mouth – receive special treatment, get-
ting substantially higher pay and research money
as well as a reduction in teaching loads.In contrast,
in most European countries the system makes little
distinction between excellent and average students
and excellent and average researchers; wages and
working conditions are mediocre and identical for
all of them; they typically depend little on achieve-
ments. The end result is not surprising: mediocre
and average researchers stay, while many of the
best emigrate to the United States.In our view,this
can only be solved in the long run if the reward
structure for knowledge producers is altered,
bringing it more in line with the US system,or with
the competitive system of professional sportsmen
and artists – the best of the latter, incidentally, are
typically rewarded very well by the taxpayer, and
this is not seen as a problem.
Another set of explanations,
however, downplays the role of
institutions and ascribes most
of the differences in technology
between Europe and the
United States to differences in
factor endowment. In particu-
lar, Beaudry and Green (2000)
have argued that a greater
endowment of physical capital
relative to human capital
implies a greater specialisation
in the “old” technology if, rela-
tive to it, the new technology is
more intensive in human capi-
tal relative to physical capital.
According to that view, the
Figure 5.1lower adoption of new information technology in
Europe is simply the outcome of its relative abun-
dance of physical capital,which itself comes from a
higher savings rate over several decades as well as
a lower population inflow due to migration. There
is no a priori reason to worry about this, since
greater abundance of capital harms no one.
Furthermore, if this explanation is to be believed,
one good side-effect of greater capital abundance
is that Europe has avoided the sharp rise in
inequality which was observed in the United
States. For example, while in the United States real
wages for men with ten to twelve years of educa-
tion have fallen by 20 per cent since 1980, they
have risen by 10 per cent in Germany.
On the other hand, the same phenomenon may be
observed in technology adoption and inequality if
instead of having more physical capital than the
United States, Europe has less human capital.
In order to see whether factor endowments have
followed divergent trends on the two sides of the
Atlantic, we look at trends in physical and human
capital. Table 5.10 compares the evolution of
human capital, as measured by average years of
education of the population, between the United
States, France and Germany. In all countries it fol-
lows an upward trend, but Europe remains clearly
behind the United States. If college graduates have
an advantage at learning and using new technolo-
gies, improvements in US educational levels, which
were associated with a rise in the proportion of col-
lege graduates, favoured IT adoption and speciali-
sation much more than improvements in European
levels,which were more associated with an increase
in the proportion of high school graduates.
This hypothesis is all the more interesting since
Nordic countries, which stand out as an exception
to the European deficit in IT adoption, have edu-
cational levels more similar to the United States
than to French and German levels, as is shown in
Table 5.11:
Admittedly, differences in years of schooling do
not take into account differences in educational
quality.In order to have an idea of that we can look
at educational achievements. Table 5.12 compares
test scores between the United States, France and
Germany:
This table suggests that there is no significant dif-
ference for 13 year-old students, although the 1972
science study suggests a substantially lower
achievement in the United States. But a subse-
quent study, limited to the United States only,
revealed a sharp improvement, so that there is rea-
son to believe that the United States has improved
its educational achievement since then.
To summarise: there is no a priori reason that dif-
ferences in school quality are strong enough to
overturn the conclusion that the United States has
a larger stock of human capital per capita.While all
three countries have accumulated human capital,
the United States may well have ended up in a
zone where it has reinforced its comparative
advantage in high technologies.
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Table 5.10
Average years of education
Period France Germany USA
1960 5.78 8.28 8.66
1965 5.86 8.25 9.25
1970 5.86 8.27 9.79
1975 6.08 7.73 10.01
1980 6.77 8.41 11.91
1985 7.31 8.98 11.71
1990 7.56 9.06 12
1995 7.94 9.57 12.18
2000 8.37 9.75 12.25
Source: Barro-Lee Data Set.
Table 5.11
Average years of education
Period Finland Norway Sweden
1960 5.37 6.11 7.65
1965 5.78 6.18 7.66
1970 6.5 7.36 7.47
1975 7.23 7.71 8.44
1980 8.33 8.28 9.47
1985 7.95 8.4 9.22
1990 9.48 10.85 9.57
1995 9.82 11.82 11.23
2000 10.14 11.86 11.36
Source: Barro-Lee Data Set.
Table 5.12
Test scores
Subject/year France Germany USA
Math, 1993–98, 13 yr. 49.2 48.4 47.6
Science, 1970–72, 17 yr. 30.5 44.8 22.8
Science, 1993–98, 13 yr. 45.1 49.9 50.8
Reading, 1990–91, 13 yr. 54.9 52.2 53.5
Average score in cross-country comparable proficiency
tests.
Source: Barro-Lee Data Set.CESifo Forum Special 69
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Turning now to physical capital intensity,Table 5.13
reports capital/labour ratios. These data are some-
what consistent with the view that physical capital
abundance deters adoption of new information
technologies, since production in Germany is more
capital-intensive than in the United States,while the
capital/labour ratio rose faster in France than in the
United States, leading it to overtake the United
States.
This discussion suggests that differences in factor
endowments have played a significant role in
explaining differences in technology levels across
the Atlantic. This being said, despite the “Nordic
exception”, we are reluctant to dismiss the view
that excess regulation is harmful for growth and
innovation. The differences in entrepreneurial
activity, for example, are large and appear in all
sectors. It is hard to explain them as just a conse-
quence of the fact that Europe uses the old tech-
nologies more. And regulation certainly has to do
with the fact that while their high education level
and small size has induced Nordic countries to spe-
cialise in IT, they have not managed to grow at the
same rate as the United States in recent years.
Finally, the strong slowdown in the United States
in 2001 raises the question of whether the IT boom
will have any long-lasting effect at all. We believe
that it will. New technologies are not introduced
smoothly and can be subject to business cycles if
they lead to excess investment followed by a bru-
tal adjustment. But they can still have long-run
effects, and countries that invest heavily in a tech-
nology may well end up with a permanent produc-
tivity bonus relative to others,as well as a compar-
ative advantage in using and improving such tech-
nology.
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
The preceding analysis suggests that the following
reforms would help in fighting the productivity
deficit that Europe seems to have accumulated
since the 1990s:
1. Proceed further with the introduction of com-
petition in the telecom market, as we have seen
that higher access prices are strongly correlated
with lower IT penetration.
2. Develop incentives in terms of financial rewards
and working conditions for top researchers to
remain in European universities. This implies
introducing a competitive labour market for such
positions and an incentive structure for universi-
ties to engage in high level research.
3. While labour market reform is a wider issue
that cannot be dealt with independently of the
welfare state (see Chapter six), before a social
consensus is reached on this issue, it is worth
considering the introduction of exemptions to
labour regulation (e.g.dismissal costs and work-
ing hours) for start-up firms in selected high-
tech industries.
4. One should investigate the reasons for the
underdevelopment of venture capital markets
in Europe and remove them. If it is due to
investors having wrong expectations about the
future prospects for such markets, one could
consider a co-ordinated move to escape from
this expectational trap.
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